Zero-Knowledge Object-Comparison System Demonstrated in Nature Communications


Future arms control agreements may require trusted verification mechanisms aimed at confirming the authenticity of items presented as nuclear warheads. In the last five years, our team has been pioneering a warhead verification approach based on the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs. This approach could allow the authentication of nuclear warheads without sharing any design information.

The original idea was published in Nature in June 2014. Since then, we have been working on the development of a zero-knowledge object-comparison system and the procedures for its use in nuclear warhead inspections. The demonstration of such a system is now outlined in a Nature Communications article published on September 20, 2016.

For more information, you can check our zero-knowledge warhead verification project page. The Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory has made a video about the experiments (see the press release here).

Alex Wellerstein has written a nice story about our work and experiments in the New Yorker.